Climate Change, Poverty, and Migration, Part 3: The Implications

by Quentin Wodon

In the previous two posts in this series, I argued that households in climate-affected areas are highly vulnerable to extreme weather shocks, and often cannot cope and adapt adequately to changing climatic conditions. Households also are often not able or willing to relocate to areas less affected by poor climatic conditions. The evidence was based on two recent studies – one for the Middle East and North Africa region where droughts and floods are common, and the other for the Sundarbans in South Asia (let me know if you would like a print copy) where cyclones and associated sea surges are frequent. I would like to complete this series of three posts with a discussion of the implications of the findings for policy makers and service clubs.

Implications for Policy Makers

First, communities affected by changing climatic conditions and weather shocks need more government support to help with short-term coping and medium-term adaptation. The cost of weather shocks and climate change is already felt today by many households, but most have limited ways to cope and adapt. While the two studies on which this series of three posts are based did not provide a cost-benefit analysis to assess which types of programs and policies might help households the most in each country context, there is a clear gap in the public provision and financing of coping and adaptation interventions. This leaves individuals and communities vulnerable and alone in making decisions, which may in turn lead to uncoordinated action and “maladaptation”.

The role of safety nets and social protection programs is especially important to enable households to cope. But the design, coverage and placement of these programs should not be just for the purpose of minimizing the immediate or even future impacts of weather shocks and climate change; safety nets should be seen as an integral part of governments’ broader strategy towards poverty reduction and – in this case – urbanization. They should aim to provide portable skills (human capital) such as a better education for those that need support the most, so that migration becomes more beneficial for the migrants and their family back home through remittances.

Second, migration policy needs to understand and address climate-induced migration in the context of other push and pull factors. Migration is a form of adaptation, but it appears to be often seen as a solution of last resort by households. One reason for this is that migration may be perceived as more costly than other strategies such as using savings, selling assets, or getting into debt to cope with shocks. In addition to material costs (travelling and re-lodging), migration implies substantial risks due to unknown outcomes at the place of destination. It also entails non-economic costs stemming from the uprooting of individuals, households, and sometimes communities. Those left behind may be precluded from reaping the benefits from migration when remittances are hampered by the high cost of remitting or by the fact that migrants have a hard time finding jobs. Policy responses and development interventions need to recognize that migration is or should be a viable and legitimate mechanism through which households address risks to their livelihoods, and a means of adapting to weather shocks and changes in climatic conditions and their impacts. Migration should not be considered as something that needs to be avoided.

Third, enabling communities in sending areas to better leverage the benefits of migration is a better alternative than progressive forced displacement. The effective economic insertion of migrants in urban and other destination areas leads to opportunities for the sending communities through remittances. But without a facilitating environment, remittances may be used for pure consumption and the accumulation of non-productive assets. Among others, incentives should be provided for sending areas, when feasible, to use remittances for productive investments.

Implications for Service Clubs

What do the findings imply for service clubs? There cannot be any cookie-cutter recommendation, but when service clubs are implementing projects in climate-affected areas, they should maintain a balance between responding to immediate needs, and confronting long-term challenges. Many households are left vulnerable in climate-affected areas due to lack of government programs. After weather shocks (or other natural disasters such as the recent earthquake in Nepal) hits, Rotarians should mobilize to provide emergency relief. As I mentioned it on this blog, I wonder whether there is a potential role for the Rotary Foundation (TRF) to play here. Currently, TRF does not seem to have a system to provide incentives (matching funds) for individual Rotarians or clubs to donate in times of crisis. Many Rotarians donate when a major crisis hits, but they do so through other organizations. If TRF could set aside some funds to match individual or club donations by Rotarians at time of crises, this could help the foundation raise more funds. It could also help TRF gain even more visibility as a humanitarian organization.

Beyond emergency relief, what may matter even more in the long run are innovative project responses. It would for example be interesting to assess whether investments by Rotary in education projects in climate-affected areas help in improving the likelihood that younger individuals migrate under good conditions to help themselves as well as their family back home. Perhaps one could even think of pilot projects in which Rotarians involved with banking and credit institutions facilitate the flow of remittances from migrants by reducing the cost of remitting, while also promoting investments for productive uses in sending areas through some forms of matching grants for communities. Such projects would have to be evaluated properly to ensure that they are indeed impactful.

These are just a few ideas, but innovative projects implemented by Rotary clubs as pilots, with proper evaluation of impacts, could have larger impacts down the road than traditional grants as other organizations would be able to scale up initiatives that appear especially promising. Not all global grants should be designed that way, but more could. The need for innovation is perhaps largest in those areas of the world where households are especially vulnerable due to repeated weather shocks that will be exacerbated by climate change, as well as other natural disasters.

 

Climate Change, Poverty, and Migration, Part 2: The Evidence

by Quentin Wodon

How devastating are weather schocks associated with climate change for the populations affected? Are the populations able to cope with and adapt to the shocks? Do they migrate away from the affected areas? These are the questions that were considered in two recent studies, one for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the other for the Sundarbans in South Asia. The book for the MENA region was published last year and is available electronically free of charge here. The book on the Sundarbans was published last month – it is not yet open access, but I received quite a few copies, so if you would like a print copy, please send me an email with your address through the Contact Me page.

Recall that the argument outlined in the first post in this series has three parts: (1) households often suffer from large losses when affected by weather shocks; (2) they have limited ways to cope and adapt; and yet (3) hosueholds affected more do not have higher migration rates away from the areas. In this post, I will share  evidence that backs up these conclusions. In the next post, I will discuss implications of the findings for humanitarian organizations and service clubs.

Impact of Weather Shocks on Households

Surveys were implemented in climate-affected areas of the MENA region and in the Sundarbans. In the MENA surveys, households could identify droughts, floods, storms, mudslides, excessive heat, excessive rain, pest infestation, crop and livestock diseases, and other events as having affected them. In the Sundarbans, the questionnaire identified cyclones, droughts, floods, and other events. Almost all households said that they had been affected by adverse weather events in the five MENA countries as well as in the Sundarbans (the exception was Egypt where the proportion was smaller, but still above two thirds). When asked which type of adverse event had the largest negative consequences for them, households in the MENA countries cited droughts first, followed by excessive heat and floods. In the Sundarbans, households cited mostly the cyclones.

In the MENA region, more than half of the respondents said that changes in weather patterns had led to a loss of crops, and more than a third reported a loss of income. About a fourth reported a loss of livestock. Poorer households were more likely to be affected than richer households, which is not surprising given that poorer households are more likely to be farmers and rely on rainfed agriculture. In the Sundarbans, more than a third of households declared that their dwelling had been completely destroyed by cyclones. Another third said that their dwelling had been partially destroyed. All these losses are rather large, showing that the populations in the areas surveyed are highly vulnerable to extreme weather shocks that indeed have dramatic consequences.

Ability to Cope and Adapt

How do households cope with losses generated by weather shocks? Questions were asked about what households did in the recent past and what they would do in the future in case of a new shock. In the MENA region, almost two thirds of households declared that they have used or would use their savings to cope. Close half have sold or would sell assets, have asked or would as for loans, and have sold or would sell livestock. More than a third have withdrawn or would withdraw their children from school. In the Sundarbans, responses were similar, but the proportion of households declaring that they had withdrawn their children from school or would do so in case of a new shock was smaller. Overall, these coping strategies make sense, but they also show how households often must take desperate measures – such as selling productive assets – to survive. Such coping strategies may have long term negative consequences for the ability of households or their children to emerge from poverty. In addition, in a separate survey for Morocco households declared that they had not been able to recover from losses associated with the weather shocks years after the events.

The data also suggest that households are often not able to implement adaptation strategies to deal with extreme weather shocks and a changing environment. For example, some twenty different adaptation strategies were listed in the MENA questionnaires, and only a minority of households declared implementing these strategies. Community and government programs were also scarce, with the exception of a few government-led safety net programs in the Sundarbans.

Decisions to Migrate

One would expect that if households are repeatedly affected by weather shocks, and if they have limited ways to cope and adapt, younger household members would migrate away. The evidence however suggests that households more severely affected by the shocks are not much more likely to send members away than other households.

  • When households are asked in the surveys about the reasons why some of their members migrate temporarily or permanently, reasons directly related to climatic factors such as droughts, floods, or cyclones do not come up much –socio-economic factors, such as better opportunities for employment at the place of destination, are cited much more often.
  • Regression analysis suggests that the impact of perceptions regarding changing climatic conditions as well as actual weather shocks on migration is small. Households who perceive worsening climatic conditions do not have much higher permanent migration rates among their members than households who do not perceive such changing climatic conditions to the same extent. The same holds for the severity of the impact of whether shocks on households – temporary migration is affected (more severely affected households have more temporary migrants), but this is less the case for permanent migration.
  • Analysis of census data suggests that “push” factors such as climatic conditions at the place of origin (temperature and rainfall) affect migration patterns only in a limited way, with again socio-economic “pull” factors at the place of destination playing a much larger role in migration movements.
  • In the MENA region, qualitative focus groups help explain why permanent migration does not seem to be higher amomg households affected more severely by extreme weather events and changes in the climate: many migrants are simply not doing very well at their place of destination.

Overall, these various strands of evidence provide back-up for the argument that many household members in climate-affected areas may be unable or unwilling to migrate away, at least under present conditions. Many households may be trapped where they are with all the risks that this entails as climatic conditions continue to worsen in the future. In the last post in this series, I will discuss the implications of such findings.